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Intellectual History and the History of
Economic Thought: A Personal Account
Donald Winch
Donald Winch (1935-2017), a pioneer of intellectual history and one of the incep-
tors of the so-called “Sussex school”, gave the following talk at the École Normale
Supérieure de Cachan on 21 December 2006. It provides a history of his own en-
gagement with the history of economic thought, and his gradual movement from
tribe of historians of economics to that of intellectual historians. We present it here
in the original form of the ms.; only some punctuation and quotation marks have
been regularized, and an URL has been updated.
Introduction
Donald Winch gave the following talk at the École Normale Supérieure de
Cachan on 21 December 2006. It provides a history of his own engagement
with the history of economic thought, and his gradual movement from the tribe
of historians of economics to that of intellectual historians. One of key points
Winch made was that he was fortunate in being able to obtain positions in de-
partments of economics despite his historical interests.This changed, of course,
during Winch’s career, and the following is a telling commentary by a master
of the historical craft.
For those who are not aware, Winch was born in 1935, read economics at the
LSE and completed his PhD at Princeton in 1960, being supervised by the inspi-
rational Jacob Viner, upon whom he comments revealingly here. After a post-
doctoral position at Berkeley, for three years, Winch was lecturer in economics
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at Edinburgh, between 1960 and 1963, before moving to the recently-founded
University of Sussex, where he served for over fifty years, becoming Profes-
sor of the History of Economics (from 1969) and ultimately Emeritus Professor
of Intellectual History (from 2006). Winch’s first book, Classical Political Econ-
omy and Colonies, appeared in 1965. It was followed by Economics and Policy:
A Historical Study (1969) and (with Susan K. Howson) The Economic Advisory
Council, 1930-1939: A Study in Economic Advice during Depression and Recovery
in 1976. By this timeWinch was recognised as a leading historian of economics.
He became a leading intellectual historian through his next book,Adam Smith’s
Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision (1978). In the 1970s Winch spent
time at Princeton University as a visiting fellow, and worked alongside another
visitor,Quentin Skinner. It was Skinner, Winch always made clear, who opened
his eyes to developments in intellectual history, and who persuaded him to en-
gage with Adam Smith’s writings through the interpretative prisms of both
classical republicanism and natural jurisprudence. Winch’s work on Smith, af-
ter a brilliant introduction toMalthus (1987), was followed up by another classic
work, Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain,
1750-1834 (1996). The book that Winch mentions in the following personal ac-
count was the last he was to publish:Wealth and Life: Essays on the Intellectual
History of Political Economy in Britain, 1848-1914 (2009). Winch was meticulous
in preparing everything that he wrote for publication, and would have looked
askance at publications in his name that appeared posthumously. While this
should be born in mind, this piece merits publication, because it gives an in-
sight into Winch’s preoccupations having experienced an anti-historical revo-
lution in economics, and the growth of intellectual history as a new discipline,
which was transforming approaches to traditional subjects across the arts and
humanities.
Richard Whatmore
University of St. Andrews
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Intellectual History and the History of Economic Thought:
A Personal Account
Donald Winch
Our deliberations belong to the meta-historical branch of inquiry known as
historiography, the principles or practices that either do in fact underpin our
branch of historical research and writing, or should do so. As in the related case
of the history and methodology of science, analysis and prescription are diffi-
cult to separate, though the effort still seems worth making. My subject is the
relationship between the history of economic thought (HET) and intellectual
history (IH), and my opinions on this relationship derive from personal experi-
ence as an intellectual historian working, at different times, on the borderline
between economics, politics, and the moral or social sciences. I stress personal
because my historiographic preferences are probably at least as much contin-
gent as exemplary, and therefore at best an unreliable guide to how others have
behaved or ought to do so. At my age, too, it is no longer safe to assume that
the formative influences on my own work are likely to be familiar to an au-
dience coming to the subject with newer perspectives and shorter memories.
Those who have read the two pieces of work I mentioned to Philippe Fontaine
as indications of my position on these matters will know that I have not always
been as non-judgemental as I shall try to be on this occasion¹. Like anyone else,
when engaged in controversy I have been critical of approaches to HET that
I find blinkered. On this occasion I want to make an effort to avoid artificial
widening of the schisms between historians of differing persuasion: one histo-
rian’s footnotes are often the subject of another’s texts, and vice-versa.
¹ “Adam Smith’s Problems and Ours”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 44:4, September 1997,
384-402; and “Does Progress Matter?”, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 7:4,
Winter 2000, 465-84.
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IBut first we should make sure we are talking about the same thing.The histo-
ries with which we are chiefly concerned deal with ‘the economic’ in one of its
many guises: theory, policy, doctrines, ideology, and the professional deforma-
tion that comes with being an economist. Traditionally, historians of economic
thought have engaged in practitioner history; they have been economists writ-
ing for the edification or entertainment of fellow economists, a tribe whose
historiographic tastes are reasonably uncomplicated. The tribe has chiefly been
interested in genealogical questions treated teleologically: how did economics
arrive at its present state, where this can either be seen as the latest end point in
a triumphant history of modern sophistication or as cause for concern? When
that history has been written or inspired by major practitioners – by Marx,
Jevons, or Keynes, for example – it has been an offshoot of revisionist discon-
tent or intra-professional warfare. At other moments it has been more com-
placent and on both kinds of occasion it has inspired the reflections of master-
practitioners on the way in which the craft should be practised – a few of which
I will cite in a moment.
As a pedagogic practice the history of economics was sustained within this
practitioner-oriented setting by occupancy of an entrenched role within the
curriculum based on the conventional idea that history of the discipline was
an effective mode of initiation. Here, of course, lies the main source of the dif-
ficulties confronting historians of economic thought: for several decades now
they have faced indifference to the history or histories they write from their
natural audience, the economists, with the result that their pedagogic role has
been eroded, often to the point of extinction, especially in the Anglo-American
world. HET seems like the last bastion of ‘literary’ economics, driven into a
corner by the advance of mathematics and econometrics, and by the explosion
in the number of sub-specialisms which make up the modern division of labour
in economics.
This state of affairs has prompted many reflections of a pre- or post-mortem
kind. My own were given prematurely over four decades ago. I favoured a bid
for freedom from a role that entailed meeting the capricious and unhistorical
demands of economists. This was linked to a plea for independence along the
lines that historians of the natural sciences had already achieved. I was and
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remain impressed by what I know of the history of science literature, by the
continuity of its concerns and by its standards of scholarship. My concern was
mainly with the future of research in HET rather than with its teaching, but
in 1962 I had little idea of how academic independence could be acquired by
an individual scholar, let alone by a collectivity. My views are, in essence, un-
changed, but they were so poorly expressed on that occasion that it would be
embarrassing to revive them any further¹.
Instead, I would like to call upon some recent mature reflections by a near
contemporary, Craufurd Goodwin, in an article on HET that will appear in
the updated version of The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Goodwin’s
survey covers the period from the Physiocrats to the present day, when the
sub-discipline within economics now catalogued under the oddly hubristic ti-
tle, ‘Methodology/History of Thought’, faces a problem of whether it will con-
tinue to renew itself and maintain the clear but marginal role it currently oc-
cupies within the expanded realm of professional economics. While that is a
problem of some urgency to those who continue to make their living within
this sub-discipline, I want to concentrate more on Goodwin’s depiction of an
Anglo-American ‘golden age’ that lasted from the inter-war period until the
1960s:
The authors in the Golden Age were committed to understanding problems through
use of HET as an analytical device. They did not think of HET as a separate new sub-
discipline, as ultimately it was to become, but as an overlay of all economics, a distinct
approach to all economic problems that should be explored as fully as more conventional
theoretical and empirical approaches.
Moreover, the new interestwas not confined to those holding any one ideological, method-
ological or doctrinal position.
The illustrative list of names that Goodwin gives for this golden age neatly
underlines his point about the catholicity of that generation’s theoretical and
ideological affiliations².
¹ “What Price the History of Economic Thought?”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 9:4, 1962,
193-204.
² Martin Bronfenbrenner, John R. Commons, Maurice Dobb, John Kenneth Galbraith, Gottfried
Haberler, John Hicks, Terence Hutchison, John Maynard Keynes, Frank Knight, Fritz Machlup,
Wesley Mitchell, Lionel Robbins, Eric Roll, Paul Samuelson, Joseph Schumpeter, G.L.S. Shackle,
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Goodwin goes on to mention some of the children and grandchildren of this
golden age, those who continued the habits of their mentors into the era when
HET had become a separate sub-discipline, with the results of research now be-
ing published in specialist journals rather than mainstream ones. Two or three
of the people who will be attending the workshop in Cachan appear on these
lists, as would a less self-effacing Goodwin himself, who has the unique experi-
ence of having edited the first of the HET journals, History of Political Economy,
since its inception in 1969. He also notes something about which he clearly feels
ambivalent:
Some of those who resisted the increasing technological sophistication of the discipline
also sought refuge. These refugees while providing welcome additions to the ranks of
HET, and offering varied perspectives on a variety of issues, because of their frequent
attacks on the way in which economics itself has evolved have tended to mark the entire
sub-discipline of HET as made up of malcontents.
I share that ambivalence while at the same time wishing to point out some-
thing Goodwin would not deny, namely that some of the names on his ‘golden’
list were also malcontents, out of harmony with what they saw as mainstream
thinking.
I was probably the last PhD student Jacob Viner supervised. He features as
one of the economists on Goodwin’s ‘golden’ list, and I can vouch for the truth
of much of what Goodwin says about that generation. Viner may be a partial
exception because he had made the transition from being a historian of eco-
nomics into becoming an intellectual historian long before I first encountered
him in 1957, with the end of his teaching career in sight¹. But this does not af-
fect the diagnosis Goodwin offers to account for the loss of centrality of HET
within the economics profession:
Joseph Spengler, George Stigler, Piero Sraffa, and Jacob Viner.
¹ If Viner’s Studies in the Theory of International Trade (1937) fits into a generous interpretation of
the history of economic theorising, his much-cited article on “Adam Smith and Laisser Faire” in J. M.
Clark (ed.),Adam Smith, 1776-1926 (1928) shows him to have combined this with work that deserves
to be described as intellectual history, the term he increasingly used to describe the results of his
historical scholarship as it expanded to include the role of providence and other religious ideas
with economic significance; see my article on “Jacob Viner as Intellectual Historian”, Research in
the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, volume 1, 1983, 1-17.
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… by the 1960s economics had once again regained its self-confidence and there was a
reversion to the set of attitudes that prevailed before World War I. Most of the questions
that appeared after this war and grew in urgency over the next forty years seemed either
to be answered or to have gone away by the 1950’s. There was no longer a need to look
backward, it seemed, only ahead.
II
At this juncture, however, my recollections take a different path, and I can
best make this plain by reminding you of the obiter dicta of three other repre-
sentatives of Goodwin’s golden age, Joseph Schumpeter, Paul Samuelson, and
George Stigler. In his History of Economic Analysis, the first of these highly in-
fluential figures asserted that “economic analysis has not been shaped at any
time by the philosophical opinions that economists happen to have, though it
has frequently been vitiated by their political attitudes”.
Schumpeter warned historians of economics against “pseudo-explanations”
based on philosophy: they were “frills without importance that nevertheless
obliterate the filiation of scientific ideas”. He admired Walras above any other
economist for his contribution to general equilibrium theory, and it led him to
regret that “Walras himself attached as much importance to his questionable
philosophies about social justice, his land nationalisation scheme, his projects
of monetary management, and other things that have nothing to do with his
superb achievements in pure theory”¹. Despite writing a work of more than
1200 pages, Schumpeter also issued a warning to economists against prolonged
visits to the ‘lumber room’ of history.
In the 1950s and 60s Samuelson suggested that only those incompetent to
deal with the rigorous world of modern economics buried their heads in the
sands of the past, though brief excursions could still be justified for the pur-
pose of presidential addresses². Since he has frequently returned to HET on
other occasions, we must be grateful that he has failed to heed his own advice.
¹ History of Economic Analysis (1954), quotations taken from pp. 31-2, 827-8.
² See “Some Psychological Aspects of Mathematics and Economics”, Review of Economics and
Statistics, 36, 1954, p. 380; and “Economists and the History of Ideas”, American Economic Review,
52, 1962.
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But Samuelson’s most important dictum for historians was as follows: “Inside
every classical writer there is a modern economist trying to get born”.This con-
viction underlies his analytical reconstruction of “the canonical classical model
of political economy”, and it is revealed too in the remarkable consistency with
which he has defended teleological or Whig interpretations of HET¹.
Stigler became well known for his proprietorial claim during the 1976 bicen-
tenary celebrations of the Wealth of Nations that “Adam Smith was alive and
well and living in Chicago”. The joke was a serious one, and it was consistent
with his earlier denial that biography (though not for some reason prosopog-
raphy) had anything to contribute to HET; and his injunction that “the correct
way to read Adam Smith is the correct way to read the forthcoming issues of a
professional journal”². It also seemed to follow from this categorical statement
that “the dominant influence upon the working range of an economic theorist
is the set of internal values and pressures of the discipline”³. There was no room
here for what even Schumpeter had allowed for as pre-scientific ‘vision’.
Anyone could search the environment for something “related to the devel-
opment of economic theory”, but that kind of inquiry Stigler deemed to be “an
exercise in erudition, not in explanation”⁴.
These pronouncements by leading practitioners of economics and its history
may have been intentionally provocative (none of the examples I have chosen
had any reason to be modest); but they capture and reflect a dominant attitude
that I did not find heartening when contemplating a research career during the
post-golden age. I have recycled them here because they provide a convenient
summary of my reasons for not wanting to write HET in the manner being
prescribed.That did not, of course, preclude reading the resulting history. What
Samuelson, Stigler, Schumpeter, or any other original contributor to economics
¹ See “A Modern Theorist’s Vindication of Adam Smith”, American Economic Review, 67, 1977,
42-9; and “The Canonical Classical Model of Political Economy”, Journal of Economic Literature,
16, 1978, 1415-34. He first issued a warning against Hla Myint’s doubts about Whig history in a
review of Theories of Welfare Economics which appeared in Economica, 16, 1949, 373; and he was
still advocating Whig history in the 1980s; see “Out of the Closet: A Program for the Whig History
of Economic Science”, History of Economics Society Bulletin, 9:1, 1987, 51-60.
² “Does Economics Have a Useful Past?”, History of Political Economy, l, 1969, 221.
³ “The Influence of Events and Policies on Economic Theory” as reprinted in Essays in the History
of Economics (1965), p. 22.
⁴ Ibid., p. 19.
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has to say about the theoretical performances of his predecessors, say Ricardo
or Marx, would always be worth reading. It has far less attraction when the
practitioner has no such credentials and woodenly applies a standard piece of
textbook analysis to the task.
Schumpeter’s dogmatic statement about the irrelevance of philosophy struck
me as just that, dogma: it did not survivemyfirst attempts to understandHume’s
‘economic’ essays or make sense of the connections between theWealth of Na-
tions and Smith’s other writings as moral philosopher. As Viner pointed out in
his review of Schumpeter’s History, it was based on some rigid dichotomies be-
tween means and ends, vision and science, that made economic analysis appear
‘as a somewhat ethereal intellectual activity, without roots in values, without
entanglements with other social disciplines, without any contribution to make
to the rational selection of social ends’¹. Since my first piece of HET research
(or was it IH?) was on the ways in which classical political economy figured
in some late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century debates on empire and
colonization, I was alert to such criticisms, while at the same time not think-
ing of myself as a malcontent seeking refuge². Nor was I a convert to any of
the alternative programmes for writing history known to me at the time, the
Marx-inspired ones that centred on bourgeois ideology, and other ‘social’, ‘rel-
ativist’, and ‘externalist’ readings of economic works that promised to reveal
secrets without requiring too much attention to be paid to the texts themselves.
I might have pleaded guilty to Stigler’s charge of forsaking HET for ‘an exercise
in erudition’ if I had been more convinced that my erudition was good enough
to warrant the accusation. Having Viner as one’s first and only available role
model, as he was for some time, could be inspiriting and disheartening in equal
measure.
III
Good fortune played a part in what happened next. Those, like myself, who
acquired their doctorates while the golden age was still a living memory, could
¹ See “Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis” in Jacob Viner, Long View and the Short; Studies
in Economic Theory and Policy, 1958, p. 347.
² The results were published as Classical Political Economy and Colonies (1965).
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still obtain posts in economics departments, provided they had other strings to
their bow: mine was international economics. The University of California at
Berkeley, where I had my first teaching appointment, also gave me my first and
only chance of teaching a Plato to Nato course on HET alongside courses on
theories of international trade and economic integration. HET still had a place
in the curriculum at Edinburgh University, where I had my first British appoint-
ment; and in 1963 I was fortunate in moving to the University of Sussex, one
of the first of the ‘new’ English universities, where departments were less im-
portant than the ‘schools’ into which they were grouped: mine was the school
of social sciences. If I wanted to teach HET I could do so to small numbers
within the economics degree. A more interesting possibility came from organ-
ising an inter-disciplinary course for final-year undergraduates in all the social
science disciplines, a course centring on the methodology and history of the so-
cial sciences. Having recruited fellow historians with expertise in the history of
politics, sociology, jurisprudence, and anthropology, we enjoyed considerable
non-departmental independence to pursue our own line.
My two most important colleagues in this joint endeavour, John Burrow and
Stefan Collini, were in fact intellectual historians; and since Sussex was one of
the first British universities to offer degrees in IH, they had no need to make
compromises or find alternative homes. Within the school of social sciences
we were free to teach IH as a team without regard to single-disciplinary tram
lines. The book we published in 1983, That Noble Science of Politics; A Study in
Nineteenth-Century Intellectual History, arose from our teaching and was a good
example of the approach we followed. The introductory chapter on “Things Po-
litical and the Intellectual Historian” was our agreed historiographic manifesto.
It compared the kind of IH we intended to pursue with the single-disciplinary
Whig histories we wished to avoid. Although we did not realise it at the time
of writing, our efforts ran parallel to some notable French attempts by Francois
Furet, Pierre Rosenvallon, and others to revive ‘the political’.
I continued to teach economics and occasionally HET into the 1980s. The
break with HET – if anything so dramatic can be said to have occurred – was
encouraged bymy experiencewhenwriting a book onAdam Smith’s Politics: An
Essay in Historiographic Revision in the late 1970s. I was assisted and welcomed
by historians of political thought who had already transformed the traditional
modes of writing in that branch of IH. I refer here chiefly to Quentin Skinner
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and John Pocock; to the shift in historiographic sensibility often labelled as the
‘linguistic turn’ that their work inaugurated; and to the banner under which
they and others have subsequently been ranged, the ‘Cambridge school’¹. We
shared a basic concern with the historicity of the texts that interested us, and
their substantive work on key figures and episodes in the history of political
argumentation had scholarly qualities I would have been pleased to match.
Adam Smith was, of course, an emblematic figure in HET who also occupied
a stereotypical role in the history of political thought (HPT) as the person re-
sponsible for creating, or for embodying in some zeitgeistlich fashion, a ‘liberal
capitalist’ perspective in politics². In the political theory circles that still em-
ployed HPT as the medium through which theory was articulated, Smith often
played a more sinister part: the Wealth of Nations had disrupted a noble tradi-
tion based on active virtue and paideia, replacing it with a modern point of view
that identified civil society with the involuntary relationships of economic in-
terdependence. In that respect Smith was responsible for marginalizing or dis-
placing politics. In advancing an alternative to the liberal capitalist perspective
I was disturbing, half-unwittingly, some potent economic and political icons.
It may not be surprising that a book on Adam Smith’s politics was more sym-
pathetically received by HPT than by HET specialists. The book met with one
or two examples of blank rejection and/or incomprehension in the latter circles,
whereas in the former, even when the judgement on the underlying thesis was
adverse, it was possible to engage in serious disputes about such crucial his-
torical categories in the HPT vocabulary as republicanism, liberalism, and civic
humanism³. This reflects a major difference between the two academic com-
munities which can be summarised in the following manner: the distinction
between political theory and political science has no equivalent in the case of
economics. Just as political philosophy has clearer connotations than anything
called ‘economic philosophy’, so HPT has retained a central role in political
¹ For a French perspective on this see Julien Vincent, “Concepts et contextes de l’histoire intel-
lectuelle britannique; l’‘École de Cambridge’ a l’épreuve”, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine,
50, 2, 2003, 187-207.
² For a definition of this term seeAdam Smith’s Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision (1978),
Chapter 1.
³ See my responses to critics in “Adam Smith and the Liberal Tradition” in Knud Haakonssen (ed),
Traditions of Liberalism: Essays on John Locke, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill (1988), pp. 83-104.
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theory that has no equivalent in the case of economic theory. In this respect it
is not surprising that exponents of the ‘linguistic turn’ have had their greatest
impact in HPT and political theory, despite the fact that the interpretative prin-
ciples involved are applicable to any kind of text. They have had practically no
influence, as far as I can see, on the writing of HET. One thing HPT and HET
groups had in common, however, was resistance to revisionist interpretations
of iconic figures. Trying to convince economists that a major part of Smith’s
intellectual enterprise could best be seen as a contribution to an eighteenth-
century project to construct a ‘science of the legislator’ has proved as difficult
as getting political theorists to acknowledge that Smith might not be a ‘liberal’
in any of the conventional modern senses of the term.
IV
The professional deformation on display here could be attributed to lack of
historical imagination. More plainly, it could also be described as unawareness
of anachronism and the consequences of attributing to one’s historical subjects
ideas that one might like them to have entertained, but which they would have
found unintelligible.The same problem arose when dealing with another iconic
figure, Robert Malthus. Taking on Malthus was partly a response to a criticism
of mywork on Smith. By emphasising the contemporary linguistic and political
contexts that made sense of what Smith was attempting to do, by severing the
presumptive links with the present, I was accused of turning Smith’s back on
his future, on the various ways in which his successors appropriated his legacy.
My attitude to IH certainly involved drawing a distinction between studies of
authorial intention and the fortuna of the resulting work; but I had no wish
to deny the validity of historical inquiry into the way in which certain works
reveal their seminal qualities as they make their way in the world. Malthus was
as good a place as any to begin a study of the fortuna of the Wealth of Nations
in Britain, and it raised other issues that underlined the demarcation between
HET, conventionally considered, and IH.
Few would question the role played by religion in the history of the natural
sciences during the nineteenth century, famously so in the case of Darwinian
biology. The connections between economics and religion have been taken up
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again in recent decades, but they have largely been left to a few specialists, often
writing against the grain of work on the same subjects by their more secular-
minded colleagues¹. In my work on Malthus I argued that he should be seen
not merely as a demographer and economist, but as a political moralist whose
theological concerns were important to an understanding of his writings. The
evidence involved paying attention not merely to Malthus’s own testimony, but
to the combination of theology with Newtonian mechanics that was part of his
formation as a Cambridge mathematician destined to enter the clergy of the
Church of England. The result was hardly a novel argument to students of the
period, but when I sent an article to a well-known historian of economics, I re-
ceived a postcard which said: “You have convinced me that Malthus’s theology
is important to his economics. So much the worse for Malthus, say I”².
There are clear echoes of Schumpeter and Stigler in this casual response.
Theology constitutes extraneous matter as far as the ‘filiation of scientific ideas’
in economics is concerned: if Malthus confused his economics with theology he
was in no better position than poor Walras. Another well-known practitioner
of HET, Samuel Hollander, went one stage further: he set out not merely to
assert but to prove the irrelevance of Malthus’s theological commitments to
his political economy. In doing so he too was, implicitly at least, showing the
continued influence exerted by Schumpeter and Stigler: if philosophy could be a
detachable ‘frill’, then theology certainly was in a world dominated by secular-
minded utilitarians³.
¹ See Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement; The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic
Thought, 1785-1865, Oxford, 1988; A. M. C. Waterman, Revolution, Economics and Religion; Christian
Political Economy, 1798-1833, (1991); and Political Economy and Christian Theology since the Enlight-
enment; Essays in Intellectual History, (2004).
² I withhold the name of my correspondent partly because the communication was private, partly
because the person in question has managed in recent years to achieve a U-turn in her attitude to
these matters – though not, I hasten to add, as a result of my pleading.
³ See “Malthus and Utilitarianism with special reference to the Essay on Population”, Utilitas, 1,
1989, 170-210. For my response see “Robert Malthus: Christian Moral Scientist Arch-Demoralizer
or lmplicit Secular Utilitarian”, Utilitas, 5, 1993, 239-53.
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VLet me mention another, perhaps more central, example of the way in which
an IH approach contrasts with that normally adopted by HET. I am currently
working on a sequel to a book I wrote in 1996 on Riches and Poverty: An Intel-
lectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750-1834. The new book consists
of a set of interlinked essays designed to carry the narrative from 1848 to 1914¹.
This means, of course, that it traverses one of the most important episodes in
the history of economic analysis, the ‘marginal revolution’ and the resulting
shift from ‘classical political economy’ to ‘neo- classical economics’. The scare
quotes here signal the intellectual historian’s need to distinguish retrospective
labels from those which the historical agents themselves would have recog-
nized, a distinction between prospect and retrospect that carries less weight in
doctrinal versions of HET.
None of those now regarded as ‘classical’ economists, from Smith on to Mill
and his two orthodox disciples, Henry Fawcett and John Elliot Cairnes, de-
scribed their own work as such. Nor did any of those now judged to be ‘neo-
classical’ economists use that term during the period in question. ‘Classical’ was
employed in the last decades of the century to characterize what was being re-
placed, and after 1900 some critics coined the term ‘neo-classical’ to describe
the revised outcome². The more common contemporary division was simply
between an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ generation of economists, with a hunt for ne-
glected predecessors yielding a long list of anticipators of what had been newly
rediscovered.
Retrospectively, armedwith a set of criteria, it is possible to classify economists
fairly neatly, though even then there are mixed forms. Jevons, for example,
never completely emancipated himself from older classical notions, and Mar-
shall was positively averse to being emancipated from them. There was never
¹ The provisional title is Wealth and Life: Essays on the Intellectual History of Political Economy in
Britain, 1848-1914.
² Thorstein Veblen is usually credited with the first use of ‘neo-classical’; see “The Preconceptions
of Economic Science”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 13 and 14, 1899/1900. Veblen uses the term
interchangeably with ‘semi-classical’ and ‘quasi-classical’ to describe the continuities between clas-
sical and later theories of value stressed in the work of Alfred Marshall. J.A. Hobson appropriated
the term for more overtly critical purposes; see “Neo-Classical Economics in Britain”, Political Sci-
ence Quarterly, 40, September, 1925, 337-83.
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complete agreement on who or what should be thought of as belonging to the
‘old’ or ‘new’, and whether ‘old’ connoted ground-breaking rather than wrong-
headed and outdated. Indeed, a significant part of the controversies of the pe-
riod took the form of appeals to the ‘true’ lineage of the science, with the aim, in
a phrase that had more resonance in the new railway age, of establishing who
had been responsible for shunting the economic train onto the wrong/right
lines. There are good historical reasons, then, for treating the binary division
between classical and neo-classical economics with suspicion. As a guide to
attitudes to questions of social and economic policy, the application of classi-
cal and neo-classical labels to Mill and Jevons, for example, two figures clearly
standing on opposite sides of the binary line, turns out not to have much power
to discriminate. The same goes for Henry Sidgwick and Alfred Marshall.
In IH the emphasis has to be placed on prospective as opposed to retro-
spective criteria of significance. We cannot write history without the benefit
of hindsight, but we are free to decide whether to portray our historical actors
according to the manner in which they led their lives, or on how they might
have done so if they possessed our knowledge of later outcomes. There is noth-
ing to say that we should avoid the latter perspective, but it places historical
actors in a different position from the one we occupy ourselves, an omniscient
and judgemental stance I find difficult to defend. For like ourselves, historical
actors lived their lives looking forwards, often short-sightedly so.
The doctrinal histories generated by HET are more committed to the con-
struction of genealogies that chart those routes that were or were not successful
in anticipating our current interests and values. With this comes a tendency to
create lines of descent that distinguish the acknowledged thoroughbreds from
the also-rans, some of whom may have seemed more fleet of foot to their con-
temporaries than they do to us. IH tends to be more tolerant of ‘failure’ in
this respect, sometimes disgracefully so in the eyes of doctrinal historians. It
also tends to be more episodic than linear, where the episodes are measured in
months and years, a human life span at best, but rarely a century or an epoch.
They are ‘humane’ in one of its many senses in eschewing the God-like stance
– or rather perhaps in this case, that of the latest issue of a professional jour-
nal in the manner advised by Stigler. With this goes a preference in my case
for essays as opposed to chapters as the natural dividers and unit of measure-
ment: essays seem better suited to the episodic character of intellectual history,
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where an episode can be connected with an author or issue and followed to a
local conclusion.
VI
With the foregoing as background I can now attempt to answer the tricky
question about audiences put to me by Philippe Fontaine. Having left one the-
atrical troupe to join another, it might be expected that I would have clear ideas
on what that move entailed, if not before then certainly after the event. Within
the stable disciplinary communities of modern academic life the professional
audience roughly corresponds with the readership of the mainstream journals
in the field. Like others of my generation, I published articles in the economic
journals before they began to close their doors and windows on HET, and be-
fore the specialist journals serving the HET community were founded. As one
would hope, these journals have interpreted their task in a more generous fash-
ion than their predecessors; but they are still serving an audience presumed to
have been trained as economists and typically occupying posts in departments
of economics. One sees fewer articles devoted to ‘x’s anticipation of (or lit-
tle known contribution to) b’, where b is some modern or fashionable piece of
economic analysis; or that other infallible sign that Whig history continues to
rule, the hunt-for-neglected-predecessors type of article. These modes of writ-
ing have not disappeared entirely and the accepted canon of economic theorists
continues to have a major influence on what counts as significant. But no one
brought up as an economist should treat consumer demand with indifference:
the present state of affairs in HETwill continue as long as an audience exists for
such work. Those dissatisfied with the existing dispensation are free to search
for alternative outlets for a different kind of history.
For historians whose engagement with modern economics remains both ac-
tive and critical this will seem to be an evasive or escapist piece of advice. Heinz
Kurz offers a bolder solution in his presidential address to the European Soci-
ety for the History of Economic Thought given this year¹. Summarized briefly
and inadequately, Kurz wants HET to take back territory it has conceded too
¹ “Whither history of economic thought? Going nowhere rather slowly?” at http://www.eshet.
net/index.php?a=18&oc=16&d=25 [Accessed Dec 20, 2017].
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readily to a profession whose work, in Lionel Robbins’s phrase, is character-
ized by ‘provincialism in time’. Kurz seeks to curb the subjective originality
that comes from ignorance of the past; and to subject current economic theo-
rizing to more testing challenges than those supplied by the limited resources
and criteria embodied in present economists’ toolboxes and expectations. His
plea is directed as much to economists as historians and represents a move in
the opposite direction from the one I have advocated and followed.
One could describe Kurz’ s approach as vertical, mine as horizontal. His in-
volves intervention in the conversations presumed to be taking place vertically
between economists across different periods. My ex-colleague, Stefan Collini
has expressed the horizontal alternative for intellectual historians better than I
can:
… the tendency of recent work has been towards excavating a more ‘horizontal’ site,
exploring the idioms and preoccupations of a past period as they manifest themselves in
thought and discussion about various issues that cannot readily be assigned to current
academic pigeon-holes. In other words, rather than constructing a ‘history of ideas’,
where the emphasis is on the logical structure of certain arguments that are seen as
only contingently and almost irrelevantly located in the past, the informing aspiration
has been to write an ‘intellectual history’, which tries to recover the thought of the past
in its complexity and, in a sense which is neither self-contradictory nor trivial, as far as
possible in its own terms¹.
The audience for such work has to be more amorphous than one that me-
diates its relationship to the world via a modern social science. It consists of
fellow historians of all kinds working on the same period or with an interest
in the way similar idioms and preoccupations feature in dissimilar discursive
settings or periods. The manner in which economic ideas are often bypassed or
mistreated by other kinds of historian, social, economic, political, and cultural,
suggests the need to open up new conversations with them rather than simply
to continue existing ones with fellow historians of economics. Better service
can be done to the nature of economists’ modes of thought by revealing them
to have been, like any genuine intellectual activity, genuinely problematic.
¹ See his introduction to Stefan Collini, RichardWhatmore, and Brian Young (eds), Economy, Polity,
and Society: British Intellectual History 1750-1950 (2000), p. 3.
Intellectual History and the History of Economic Thought: A Personal Account 6 : 17
Reaction against the tendentious versions of the history of economic thinking
that have appeared in the work of literary and cultural historians has certainly
played a part in fuelling my own interest in supplying an antidote¹. Fortunately,
there are signs in the early years of the twenty-first century that the engage-
ment of literary historians with the serious economic literature of the past is
moving beyond the old stereotypes, making rapprochement with intellectual
histories of economic debate possible².
When conversing with other historians there is usually a moment when I
become aware that my formative years were not spent as theirs were spent.
My earlier reference to theatrical troupes might be more accurately rendered
as something akin to a gypsy existence, enjoying one historical site before mov-
ing on to another. Or, to shift to a sporting image favoured by the Sussex team
I mentioned earlier, being an intellectual historian seems to involve playing
most of one’s games away from home, never being entirely sure of the pitch
conditions, the home side’s peculiarities, and what kind of audience, if any,
would tum up to cheer or jeer the performance. This may be the result of not
having any permanent home ground of one’s own, with the further result that
one tends to pick and choose from among the invitations sent by others on the
basis of guesswork. A preference for writing books over articles could be an-
other result: books offer more of a chance to act as one’s own editor, speaking
directly to the imagined audience beyond one’s immediate friends. My imagi-
nation is large, but publishers tell me that the audience for my books is, if not
exactly small, then definitely not large: where exactly it is to be found is still
something of a mystery. Any well-authenticated evidence of sightings will be
gratefully received.
¹ See “Mr Gladstone and Jerusalem” in the work mentioned in the previous note, pp. 243-66.
² See especially Philip Connell’s strikingly original work on Romanticism, Economics and theQues-
tion of ‘Culture’ (2001). For commentary on how rapprochement has become possible see Catherine
Gallagher,TheBody Economic; Life, Death, and Sensation in Political Economy and the Victorian Novel
(2006).
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